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In this paper we investigate the quantitative importance of search and matching fric-
tions in Bulgarian labor markets. This is done by augmenting an otherwise standard
real business cycle model a la Long and Plosser (1983) with both a two-sided costly
search and fiscal policy. This introduces a strong propagation mechanism that allows
the model to capture the business cycles in Bulgaria better than earlier models. The
model performs well vis-a-vis data, especially along the labor market dimension, and in
addition dominates the market-clearing labor market framework featured in the stan-
dard RBC model, e.g Vasilev (2009), as well as the indivisible labor extension used in
Hansen (1985).
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1 Introduction
The standard real business cycle model with a perfectly-competitive labor market was shown
to be unable to capture the dynamics in the labor markets in Bulgaria, e.g. Vasilev (2009).
More specifically, the setup is not able to explain the presence of involuntary unemploy-
ment, and in addition cannot generate the so-called ”Beveridge curve,” the strong negative
relationship between open positions (vacancies) and unemployment.1 A strong negative cor-
relation between vacancies and unemployment has also been observed in Bulgaria, as seen
in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Beveridge curve in Bulgaria 2006-14
Several researchers have proposes that the failure of standard RBC models (e.g. Kydland
and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) for the US, and Vasilev (2009) for Bul-
garia) to capture adequately labor market dynamics might necessitates abandoning of the
Walrasian frictionless market-clearing labor market paradigm.2 Using a setup with real fric-
1The curve is named in Blanchard and Diamond (1989), in recognition of W.H. Beveridge’s (1944) original
contribution.
2Lucas (1987) took the task seriously and models the transition out of unemployment to produce a
neoclassical general equilibrium model that is able to generate involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
Other approaches include Hansen(1985) and Rogerson (1988) indivisible labor idea, where workers participate
in lotteries and can buy insurance against becoming unemployed.
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tions, Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1985) show the relevance of a search-and-matching
model in macroeconomic context, when the separation rate is taken to be exogenous. This
paper utilizes that search-and-matching framework and aims to model the labor market in
Bulgaria after the introduction of the currency board (1997) in an equilibrium real business
cycle model with fiscal policy.3,4 For that purpose, the setup in Merz (1995) is augmented
with fiscal policy a la Cristiano and Eichenbaum (1992).5 The two-sided costly labor search
and matching frictions introduced in the model setup create an inefficient outcome in the
labor market due to the search and congestion externalities.6 In the model utilized in this
paper, search and recruiting activities are viewed as costly investment activities that help
eventually augment the number of jobs created (”matches”), which in turn increases total
employment. Similarly, the vacancies that are posted by employers could be viewed as an
as asset that generates a value when the position is filled with a suitable candidate. The
market tightness, defined as the ratio of vacancies-to-unemployment, causes the search and
congestion externalities. With trade frictions in the market for labor, the search effort is
suboptimal, thus the labor input is rationed. Since this rationing is stochastic (due to the
limited information about candidates on the market and available positions), the price, i.e.,
the wage rate, is not the only allocative mechanism. Therefore, the inefficiency cannot be
eliminated by wage adjustments alone.
On the worker side, working is generally more valuable than being unemployment. However,
3For empirical studies on labor markets in Bulgaria the interested reader is referred to Lozev et al. (2011),
Paskaleva (2016), and the references therein.
4Earlier periods are excluded due to the low-quality of data from the early 1990s and the volatile time
period of the financial crisis from 1996-97.
5Wright (1986) and Howitt (1988) show how search problems may at least partially resolve the labor
market puzzles that RBC models with perfectly-competitive labor markets exhibit.
6This rigidity could be driven by heterogeneity of workers’ skill level, or the time cost involved due to the
imperfect information possessed by either side of the market. Kennan (2006) emphasizes the importance of
private information to explain unemployment over the business cycle. Vasilev (2017a, 2017b) present some
results using setups where workers’ effort is unobservable. For an excellent treatment on how earlier search
literature merged with the RBC literature, the interested reader is referred to Ramey (2011). In addition, as
Shimer (2010) argues, the search and matching mechanism could be regarded as the process captured by the
ad hoc convex labor adjustment costs introduced in some macroeconomic models, e.g. Hansen and Sargent
(1988), which helped the framework amplify employment fluctuations.
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under certain conditions, unemployment may be an optimal outcome, if it is not to the
worker’s or the employer’s advantage to continue the employment contract. Thus the model
is able to produce involuntary employment in equilibrium. More specifically, in each period
matches are destroyed with some exogenous probability, and any employed person faces a
risk of being laid off.7,8 The process of trading the labor input in an environment featuring
imperfect information, or equivalently, the search and matching frictions present in the labor
markets provide a tractable mechanism which is both realistic and plausible.
The paper proceeds to evaluate the quantitative importance of search and matching fric-
tions in the case of the Bulgarian business cycle after the introduction of the currency board
arrangement, which, when complemented with other reforms, brought aggregate stability
to the economy. Those real rigidities in the labor markets introduce history dependence in
the employment status, which makes employment, unemployment, and output more per-
sistent. Such real rigidities in the labor market could be thus regarded as a qualitatively
important propagation mechanism that can replicate data behavior, especially along the la-
bor market dimension. Overall, the search and matching model, and the trade frictions in
particular, generates persistence in output and both employment and unemployment, and is
able to respond to the criticism in Nelson and Plosser (1992), Cogley and Nason (1995) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), who argue that the RBC model does not have a strong
internal propagation mechanism besides the strong persistence in the TFP process. As in
Andolfatto (1996), incorporating search and matching frictions leads to labor productivity
in the model leading employment over the business cycle, which is what we observe in data
as well. The very low dynamic correlation between wages and employment in Bulgaria is
well-approximated in the model, mostly due to the fact that the wage rate is determined
through Nash-bargaining procedure. Finally, the dynamic correlation between vacancies
7The assumption of an exogenous job destruction rate is mainly for analytical convenience and model
tractability. Endogeneizing the separation rate, as pointed out in Pissarides (2000), does not alter funda-
mentally the job creation and job search processes. Den Haan et al. (2000) show that this feature adds more
persistence to the model variables and helps the setup capture better the volatility in job creation and job
destruction.
8Adding on-the-job search also does not change qualitatively the results, as it does not affect the main
theory of the search and matching frictions.
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and unemployment in Bulgaria is also well-captured by the model.9 The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup. Setup 3 outlines the model
parameterization and the calibration strategy employed. Section 4 presents the steady state
results. Section 5 discusses the impulse responses, compares simulated to empirical moments
and evaluates the model’s overall goodness-of-fit. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Setup
The structure of the model economy is as follows: There is a unit mass of households, as
well as a representative firm. The households own the physical capital and labor, which are
supplied to the firm. Aggregate employment depends on both the probability of matching,
and the search effort of households. There is a representative firm using a constant-returns-
to-scale technology. The firm produces output using labor and capital. It posts a vacancy to
advertise an available position. Thus, the labor market is characterized by a costly two-sided
search. The wage rate is decided via a Nash bargaining procedure. The government uses tax
revenues from labor and capital income to finance non-productive government consumption
and the lump-sum government transfers.
2.1 Households







lnCt + φ ln(1−Nt)
}
, (2.1)
where E0 denotes the expectations operator as of time 0, Ct, Nt denote consumption and
hours (employment)10 in period t, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and φ > 0 denotes
the relative weight attached to leisure in the households’ utility. As in Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996), households will be pooling together all resources and in this way achieve
9That is also a dimension that the standard RBC model calibrated to Bulgarian data (Vasilev 2009)
cannot capture, since vacancies are not featured there.
10This equivalence follows from the normalization of the mass of households, as well as setting total time
endowment equal to unity.
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full insurance against the contingency of unemployment. As a result, consumption will be
identical across households regardless of the employment status.
The households own all the capital in the economy. Aggregate physical capital evolves
according to the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt, (2.2)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate. Households will rent the capital to the firm at the
rate rt, generating rtKt in before-tax capital income.
Another source of income for the households is the labor income. Aggregate employment
evolves according to11
Nt+1 = (1− ψ)Nt + ptSt(1−Nt), (2.3)
where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 denotes the transition rate from employment to unemployment, and pt ≥ 0
denotes the probability of a match in period t, which depends on the tightness of the labor
market.12,13 Households take the probability pt at which the aggregate search effort produces
a match as given. Aggregate before-tax labor income is then wtNt, where wt is the hourly
wage rate in the economy.
Households can decide to use time and effort to improve their chances of forming a match.
As in Merz (1995), the search cost function is assumed to be monotone in the search intensity




where b0 > 0, η ≥ 1, and St > 0.14 That is, the cost of searching for a job is b0Sηt per
household, and the mass of unemployed households is 1 − Nt. Since search cost produces
11In this model we do not distinguish between unemployed and out of the labor force.
12As argued in Pissarides (2000), endogeneizing the job destruction rate does not change much the quali-
tative properties of the model.
13Note also that the equation above produces a steady state employment rate of N∗ = M∗/ψ, where M∗
are steady-state jobs created (”matches”), and thus there is a natural rate of unemployment U∗ = 1−N∗ =
1−M∗/ψ.
14Similarly, Seater (1979) also argues that the search cost function should be increasing at the margin.
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a waste of resources in the economy, total search cost will be accounted for as an output
cost.15 Households own the firm in the economy and claim all the profit. Households’ budget
constraint is then
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + b0Sηt (1−Nt) ≤ (1− τ k)rtKt + (1− τ l)wtNt + Πt +Gtrt , (2.5)
where {τ k, τ l} are the average effective tax rates on capital and labor income, Πt denote
firm’s aggregate profits, and Gtrt are government transfers.
Taking the tax rates {τ k, τn}, prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, profit {Πt}∞t=0, government transfers {Gtrt }∞t=0,
the process followed by total factor productivity {At}∞t=0 and initial conditions for capital
K0, employment N0 and technology A0 as given, households choose aggregate allocations
{Ct, Nt+1, St, Kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize (2.1) s.t. (2.2)-(2.5). The resulting first-order optimality
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Kt+1 = 0 (2.10)
where λt, µt are the Lagrangean multipliers of the budget constraint, and employment dy-
namics, respectively.
The first-order optimality conditions obtained above have standard interpretations. The
first is the optimality condition for consumption, which requires that the marginal utility
from consumption equals the marginal utility of wealth. The second is the so-called Euler
condition, which describes how households would choose capital in two congruent periods in
order to smooth consumption. The static optimality condition for the search effort balances
15Other authors that take this approach, are Phelps et al. (1970), Pissarides (1988), and Pissarides (1990).
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the costs and benefits from searching for a job. A similar logic applies to employment. We
can think of it as determining the labor supply. However, in this case choosing employment
is a dynamic problem, as the value of a match extends to more than one periods. Each
unemployed household chooses the level of search effort in order to balance the costs and
benefits at the margin. The benefit is the discounted payoff from the labor income and the
foregone search cost minus the disutility from working. As in Merz (1995), this benefit is
conditioned on ”any additional search effort leading to a job match with probability pt.” The
TVC is a boundary condition on capital, which guarantees that explosive solutions are ruled
out.
2.2 Firm
There is a representative firm in the setup using a Cobb-Douglas production function,16






where 0 < α < 1 measures capital share. With search externalities, 1 − α is no longer the
labor share. Still, the production function features constant returns to scale.
The firm chooses how much capital to rent, how many to employ, and how many vacan-
cies to advertise. Firm’s problem now becomes dynamic due to the value of the match, and
the fact that if a vacancy is filled, then the firm can economize on advertising the position.
The advertising cost incurred equals aVt, a > 0. Those are considered as part of pro-
duction costs, and thus will be deducted from the firm’s profit. The firm takes the aggregate
law of employment as a constraint when maximizing its discounted profit:
Nt+1 = (1− ψ)Nt + qtVt (2.12)
The firm takes the endogenous probability that a vacancy is filled, {qt}, as given.
16The assumption of constant returns to scale is a useful one, as it allows to think of the stand-in form as



















The first one is the usual optimality condition for capital, saying that the input is rewarded
its marginal product. The optimality condition for labor is different from the one in standard
RBC models. In the literature, the second optimality condition is also referred to as the job
creation condition (JCC).17 On the right-hand side is the effective cost of a vacancy, which is
the product of the advertising cost per opened vacancy, a, and the expected time on average
that this vacancy stays unfilled, 1/qt. The expression on the left-hand side is the expected
discounted benefit from a vacancy: when filled, the return to the firm is the difference
between the marginal product of labor less the wage, plus the saved cost on not advertising
a vacancy, weighted by the probability of the match not being destroyed.
2.3 Matching technology




where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 measures the elasticity of job matches with respect to search effort, and Vt
is the number of vacancies available in period t. This type of modeling is based on the em-
pirical findings of Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Pissarides (1986). Mortensen (1982)
and Hosios (1990) also argue that search effort should be also included as in input in the
aggregate matching function, hence the specification used above.
In addition, this type of modeling matches as described above implies endogenous prob-




















represents the tightness of the labor market. More specifically, when the market is tight, the
probability of finding a job (and filling a position) will be low. Thus, the job-finding rate










That is, the probability of making a transition from being unemployed to becoming employed











is the transition probability from an unfilled vacancy to a filled one. It is increasing in















can be interpreted as the expected duration of a vacancy.
2.4 Wage determination
The wage rate will be determined as an outcome from a Nash bargaining protocol, where the
worker and the firm will negotiate over the distribution of the rents arising from the value
of the match.18 In technical terms,
wt = arg max
w
[Wt − Ut]λ[Jt −Qt]1−λ, (2.22)
18However, this is just one way to solve the indeterminacy when it comes to the wage rate determination
in a search and matching framework.
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where the surplus to the household is the difference between Wt, the value to the household
from being employed, and Ut, the value when unemployed. From the employer perspective,
the surplus from the match is the difference between the value Jt from filling a vacancy and
Qt is the value from an unfilled vacancy.
19
















The Hosios (1990) condition in static context, and extended by Merz (1995) to dynamic
settings, γ = λ, produces perfect insurance markets, and efficiency in the outcome of the
wage-employment contracts. By setting the bargaining weights equal to the corresponding

















The expression above is also referred to as a wage schedule, or a ”wage curve,” as docu-
mented in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).
A job is an asset owned by the firm, hence the optimality condition for vacancy is akin
to an asset price equation. More specifically, a vacant job costs aV and changes state ac-
cording to a process. Given the perfectly-competitive capital markets there will not be any
capital gains/losses from expected changes in the valuation of the jobs/match. The firm
compares expected profit from an occupied job versus the firm’s expected profit from a va-
cant job.22
The wage rate is the weighted average of the marginal product of labor and the marginal
19This is just one way of decentralizing the wage-determination process. We do not discuss other ways to
set wages.
20For detailed derivations, the interested reader is referred to Merz (1995).
21Note that this result is true only for matching functions which feature constant returns to scale, which is
also the case in this paper. Also, in the presence of exogenous fiscal policy, allocations are no longer Pareto
optimal, but only ”constrained efficient.”
22The number of jobs is endogenous: it is determined by the firm’s profit maximization problem.
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rate of substitution between consumption and hours, where the latter can be regarded as
the worker’s outside opportunity.23 The weights correspond to the relative bargaining power
in the wage negotiation process. With endogenous search effort, we also have a weighted
average of the marginal benefit from searching and the marginal cost of searching.24 If the
worker is employed, s/he can save on searching, as there will not be need to re-engage in
search.
As suggested in Merz (1995), we can think of the wage expression as representing the two
”threat points” in the wage negotiations.25 On the one hand, the household asks for the
value of its marginal product less the cost of advertising born by the firm. The firm, how-
ever, would be only willing to pay the worker’s reservation wage, which equals the marginal
disutility of work less the search cost incurred. Thus the equilibrium wage rate is a weighted
average of the two, with the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the house-
holds’ total search effort St(1 − Nt) could be regarded also as the households’ bargaining
strength.26
2.5 Stochastic process
It will be assumed that total factor productivity (TFP) process {At}∞t=0 is stochastic, and
follows an AR(1) dynamics
At+1 = (1− ρa)A0 + ρAt + εat , (2.25)
23More specifically, the benefit from not working is an additional hour of leisure (hence the marginal utility
of labor), weighted by the ”price” of consumption (marginal utility of consumption).
24The downside of this procedure is that the threat is the dissolution of the match. In reality, however,
there is usually a stage of c counteroffer being put on the table. Also wages could be subject to periodic
renegotiations especially because workers and employers cannot fully predict all the dynamic effects resulting
from the match. However, staggered Nash wage bargaining procedures are left outside the scope of this paper.
25We could regard the process as a bilateral monopoly case - where both workers and firms have market
power as the sole producer and buyer of labor. As a result, there will be generally a range for the wage, or
the ”zone of potential agreement,” and the indeterminacy of the wage has to be broken by some additional
criteria, such as the Nash bargaining criterion.
26Note that despite the fact that only contemporaneous variables enter the expression for the wage rate,
both parties have fully considered all the dynamic implications that come into effect as a result of the realized
match.
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where A0 = A is the steady-state level of TFP, parameter ρa measures the persistence of
the process, and εt ∼ N(0, σ2a) are the unexpected innovations to the TFP, which are i.i.d.
normal with zero mean and standard deviation σa.
2.6 Government
The government levies taxes on both capital and labor income to finance the wasteful gov-
ernment consumption and the lump-sum transfer.27 The budget constraint is balanced in
every period.






where Gct denotes the wasteful government spending. The spending-to-output ratio G
cy =
Gc/Y will be set equal to its data average, so that the level of spending will vary with
output (since Gct = G
cy
t Yt). Government transfers will be residually determined, as they will
be allowed to vary so that the government budget constraint is balanced in every period.
2.7 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with Search
Externalities
Given the total factor productivity (TFP) process {At}∞t=0, the two tax rates {τ l, τ k}, the
initial conditions for the (endogenous and exogenous) state variables k0, A0, a Decentralized
Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with search is defined to be a sequence of prices {rt, wmt }∞t=0,
allocations {ct, it, kt, nt, ut, gt, gtrt }∞t=0, such that (i) expected utility is maximized; (ii) the
stand-in firm maximizes dynamic profit; (iii) the wage rate is determined as an outcome from
Nash bargaining between the households and the firm; (iv) government budget is balanced
in each time period; (iv) all markets clear.
27Government consumption is wasteful from the perspective that it does not enter the aggregate production
function. Without loss of generality, a utility term containing public consumption could be added to the
household’s function without affecting the results in the paper at all, since we are discussing exogenous
(observed) policies.
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3 Data and model calibration
The model is calibrated to Bulgarian data at quarterly frequency. The period under investi-
gation is 2000-2016. Quarterly data on the output, household and government consumption,
private fixed investment shares in output, employment rate, the unemployment rate, and the
vacancy rate was obtained from the National Statistical Institute (2018). Following Vasilev
(2015), capital income share is set to its average value α = 0.429, and the labor income
share is 1 − α = 0.571. Next, using Vasilev’s (2015) estimate that the annual depreciation
rate on physical capital is 5 %, in our quarterly model that corresponds to δ = 0.0125. The
annual estimates of the average capital stock to output reported in Vasilev (2015) are then
converted to quarterly ones, thus obtaining that K/Y = 13.964. This gives us sufficient
information to calibrate the discount factor from the steady-state Euler equation:
β =
1




The relative weight on leisure in the household’s utility function, parameter φ = 1.803, will
be set to match the steady-state employment rate in Bulgaria over the period, n = 0.533.
Steady-state output will be normalized to unity, which produces A = 0.605. Burda (1997)
estimates m/n = 0.009 for Bulgaria, which yields ψ = 0.009.
Scale parameter of the search cost function b0 = 0.001, which is of the magnitude chosen
in Merz (1995).28 Similarly, due to lack of information, we will assume linear search costs
and set η = 1. Again, the curvature of the search cost function does not affect our results
quantitatively. Following Aldolfatto (1996), for the advertising costs, we set per vacancy
cost a = 0.1.29 Since the shares of the search and recruiting costs in output will be shown in
the next section to be minute, the size of the scale parameters is of little importance when
it comes to the model dynamics over the business cycle. Next, the elasticity of job matches
28Merz (1995) sets this scale parameter to match unemployment duration, which is obtained as the ration
of the stock of unemployment over the new job matches. We do not have this data for Bulgaria, so the choice
for b0 is to a certain degree arbitrary. However, since the search cost is quantitatively very small relative to
output, this parameter is not a driving force in the model.
29Alternatively, the scale parameter for advertising a could be set to match average vacancy duration,
which equals the ratio of posted vacancies/newly-created job matches (v/m). Again, the size of advertising
costs are very small as a share in output.
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with respect to search effort, usually is estimated from matching function. However, given
the short series available for Bulgaria, λ = γ = 0.4 will be adopted from Blanchard and
Diamond (1990) and Petrolongo and Pissarides (2001).
Finally, the parameters for the total factor productivity process will be estimated by obtain-
ing the Solow residuals from the Cobb-Douglas production function using data on output,
capital and employment, and the estimated capital share. The Solow residuals are then
detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter. Using the now made-stationary series,
an AR(1) model was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). That produced the
consistent estimates ρ̂a = 0.7 with s.e.(ρ̂a) = 0.117, and σ̂a = 0.044, which will be used in
the simulation stage. Table 1 below summarizes the values of model parameters used in this
paper.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital share in output Data Avg.
δ 0.013 Depreciation rate Data Avg.
φ 1.803 Weight attached to utility of leisure Calibrated
η 1.000 Curvature of the search cost function Calibrated
γ 0.400 Elasticity of job matches with respect to search effort Calibrated
1− γ 0.600 Elasticity of job matches with respect to vacancies Calibrated
ψ 0.009 Transition rate from employment to unemployment Data Avg.
a 0.100 Per-unit advertising costs Set
b0 0.001 scale parameter, search cost function Set
A 0.604 steady-state value of TFP Calibrated
ρa 0.701 AR(1) persistence coefficient, TFP process Estimated
σa 0.044 st. error, TFP process Estimated
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4 Steady-State
Once model parameters were obtained, the steady-state ratios for the model calibrated to
Bulgarian data were obtained. The results are reported in Table 2 below. Overall, the
long-run behavior of data is well-matched by the steady-state values of the model. The
great ratios - consumption and investment shares - are well-approximated, as well as the
after-tax return to capital, where r̃ = (1− τ k)r − δ. Advertising and search costs are quite
small relative to the size of the economy. Thus, despite the presence of search externalities
the labor share is essentially identical to wn/y, which is the expression in the case with
perfectly-competitive labor markets.
Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run solution
Description BG Data Model
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.674 0.642
i/y Fixed investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.181
k/y Physical capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96
g/y Government cons-to-output ratio 0.176 0.176
wn/y Labor share in output 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital share in output 0.429 0.429
b0s
η/y Search cost-to-output per unemployed N/A 0.001
av/y Advertising vacancies cost-to-output N/A 0.002
n Employment rate 0.533 0.533
u Unemployment rate 0.467 0.467
m New matches 0.005 0.005
v Vacancy rate 0.004 0.004
r̃ After-tax net return to physical capital 0.010 0.018
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5 Out of steady-state model dynamics
Since the model does not have an analytical solution for the equilibrium behavior of vari-
ables, we need to solve the model numerically. This is done by log-linearizing the original
equilibrium (non-linear) system of equations around the steady-state. This transforms the
approximate dynamics of the model into one that is represented as a first-order system of
stochastic difference equations. First, we study the dynamic behavior of model variables to
an isolated shock to the total factor productivity process, and then we fully simulate the
model to compare how the second moments of the model perform when compared against
their empirical counterparts.
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection documents the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% surprise inno-
vation to technology. The impulse response function (IRFs) are presented in Fig. 2 on the
next page. As a result of the one-time unexpected positive shock to total factor productivity,
output increases. This expands the availability of resources in the economy, so consumption,
investment and government consumption also increase upon impact. At the same time, the
increase in productivity increases the after-tax return on the two factors of production, labor
and capital. Households respond to the incentives and start accumulating capital. In turn,
the increase in capital input feeds back in output and adds to the effect of the technology
shock. In the labor market, which is characterized by trade frictions, households increase
the search effort, as the value of being employed is now higher, which in turn increases the
probability of a match. On the firm side, the increase in the marginal product of labor also
makes the value of a filled vacancy higher, so firms start advertizing positions.30 Market
tightness decreases, which increases the probability of employment, and decreases the con-
gestion externalities in the labor market. Probability of becoming unemployed decreases. As
a result, employment increases, and unemployment decreases. The number of matches being
realized also increases. In turn, the increase in the labor input employed in the production
further augments the increase in output
30Interestingly, with a variable search effort in the model, the vacancy rate has to counteract the effect of
two forces, search and unemployment.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise to a technology shock
Over time, as capital is being accumulated, its marginal product starts to decrease, which
lowers the households’ incentives to save. As a result, capital returns to its steady-state fol-
lowing a hump-shaped dynamics. Consumption also exhibits the same shape in its dynamic
pattern. The rest of the variables return to their old steady-states in a monotone fashion
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as the effect of the one-time surprise innovation in technology dies out. Most of the labor
variables return to their long-run equilibrium values within 20 quarters, or 5 model years,
while capital and consumption take 8 years to return to their old steady-state values.
5.2 Simulation and moment-matching
We will now simulate the model 10,000 times for the length of the data horizon. Both
empirical and model simulated data is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter.31
Table 3 on the next page summarizes the second moments of data (relative volatilities to
output, and contemporaneous correlations with output) versus the same moments computed
from the model-simulated data. To minimize the sample error, the simulated moments are
averaged out over the computer-generated draws. The model-predicted standard errors are
reported in brackets next to the mean estimate from the model.
The model matches quite well the absolute volatility of output, the empirical estimate is
within the confidence band produced by the model. However, the model underestimates the
variability in consumption, which could be due to the presence of government consumption,
which overestimates the variability in data. The model also overestimates the variability in
investment. This shortcoming of the model could be explained by the structural transfor-
mation of government property in private hands through voucher privatization, direct sales,
and worker-management privatization. Public investment in infrastructure has been also
substantial in the last few years. Still, the model is qualitatively consistent with the stylized
fact that consumption generally varies less than output, while investment is more volatile
than output. By construction, government spending in the model varies as much a in data.32
With respect to the labor market variables, the variability of employment predicted by
the model is about the same as the one in data, but the variability of vacancies is not.
The latter might be driven again by structural issues and structural transformation of the
economy over the period. Nevertheless, the model is able to generate the Beveridge curve,
31Treatment of the data with other filters is left for a separate paper.
32Government consumption could have been matched better had we assumed that it follows a stochastic
AR(1) process. However, such a match would have been by design.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model
σy 0.05 0.07 (0.01)
σc/σy 0.55 0.10 (0.02)
σi/σy 1.77 4.38 (0.02)
σg/σy 1.21 1.00 (0.00)
σn/σy 0.63 0.72 (0.02)
σLS/σy 0.43 0.31 (0.02)
σw/σy 0.83 2.38 (0.02)
σy/n/σy 0.86 1.72 (0.02)
σu/σy 3.22 0.86 (0.12)
σv/σy 2.54 4.52 (0.07)
σθ/σy 4.42 1.88 (0.04)
σw/σn 1.32 3.31 (0.02)
corr(c, y) 0.85 0.53 (0.06)
corr(i, y) 0.61 1.00 (0.00)
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00 (0.00)
corr(n, y) 0.49 0.96 (0.01)
corr(w, y) -0.01 -1.00 (0.00)
corr(LS, y) 0.48 0.42 (0.01)
corr(θ, y) -0.98 -0.95 (0.02)
corr(u, y) -0.47 -0.95 (0.02)
corr(v, y) 0.49 0.99 (0.01)
corr(n, y/n) -0.14 -0.97 (0.00)
corr(u, v) -0.63 -0.98 (0.01)
the strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies documented in Fig. 1,
despite the presence of a variable search effort, which, according to the Merz (1995) would
cause the Beveridge curve to shift and generate a zero correlation in the model.33 This neg-
ative co-movement between vacancies and unemployment is a stylized macroeconomic facts
33Variable search in the model was introduced to enrich the labor supply mechanism.
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of the labor markets in other developed countries, e.g. US, as documented in Krause and
Lubik (2014), and at the heart of Shimer’s (2005) puzzle, as model fails to match the order
of volatility of unemployment and vacancies.34 Whatismore, the wage rate in the model is
too volatile. As pointed out in Merz (1995), any incentives for firms to advertise a vacancy
(due to increase in productivity, and thus an increase in the value of the filled vacancy) are
quickly offset by the increase in wages.35 Thus, the model fails to reproduce the variability
of both unemployment and vacancies. Vacancies vary more than in data, so tightness varies
less than in data. The reason behind this mismatch could be driven by several possible
explanatory factors: (i) the fact that the model misses the out of the labor force (the dis-
couraged workers) segment, which is significant in Bulgaria; (ii) the structural mismatch in
the economy moving from agriculture and heavy manufacturing to services, and/or (iii) the
significant emigration to Western Europe, US and Canada.36,37
As in Andolfatto (1996), the wage rate behaves like average labor productivity. One reason
for that is that the wage rule arising from the Nash bargaining leads to Pareto optimal
allocations. The other explanation is that the worker’s outside option moves in the same
directions as productivity in response to the technology shocks. In addition, the volatility of
wages is higher than the variability of labor productivity, which means that the labor share
34One interpretation that has been proposed in the search and matching real business cycle literature is
that firms do not want to hire during recessions.
35Note that since θ = v/u, when θ increases (tightness), probability q of filling a vacancy (match) decreases,
while p the job finding rate increases.
36Alternatively, Hangedorn and Manovskii (2008) introduce a very high replacement rate, which is above
the normal unemployment benefits generosity and includes an opportunity cost component. Together with
decreasing drastically workers’ bargaining power to λ = 0.05, that helps the model improve on the volatil-
ity in unemployment and vacancies. However, their calibration destroys the Beveridge curve, as it drives
the correlation between unemployment and vacancies to zero. Also, the values chosen by Hangedorn and
Manovskii does not provide by themselves a good explanation why the model fit is so good.
37In another strand of the literature, Lubik (2009) uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the
importance of search and matching frictions. He augments the framework with monopolistically-competitive
firm, mark-up shocks, and variable vacancy posting costs. Krause and Lubik (2014) argue that adding
shocks to the matching function (i.e., matching efficiency) causes the Beveridge curve to shift. In particular,
matching shocks affect more unemployment than vacancies. On the other hand, as pointed out in Pissarides
(2000), the wage equation is qualitatively the same.
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is pro-cyclical in Bulgaria. This is what we see from Table 3 above as well. This is typical
for recession periods, which is a good description for Bulgaria’s transitional experience. In
a recession, capital absorbs most of the negative effect and falls more than proportionally,
while labor falls less than proportionally. The latter is due to the presence of employment
insurance, firing costs and long-term contracts. Again, the standard RBC model cannot
explain this. Next, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, the model slightly overpre-
dicts the pro-cyclicality of the main macroeconomic variables - consumption, investment,
and government consumption. However, this is a common limitation of the whole class of
RBC models. However, along the labor market dimension, the contemporaneous correlation
of market tightness with output is well-matched. With the other variables, the signs are cor-
rect, but the model predicts a stronger co-movement than the one observed in data. Overall,
the model with search and matching provides a richer framework that is able to capture well
more aspects of labor markets in Bulgaria.
In the next subsection, we take the analysis one step further. Instead of reporting only
the contemporaneous correlation, we investigate the correlation between labor market vari-
ables at leads and lags, thus evaluating how well the model matches the phase dynamics
among variables. In addition, the autocorrelation functions of empirical data, obtained from
an unrestricted VAR(1) are put under scrutiny and compared and contrasted to the simu-
lated counterparts generated from the model. Note that after the log-linearization, the model
could be viewed as a structural VAR model, with the only source of disturbance being the
innovations to the total factor productivity.
5.3 Auto- and cross-correlation
This subsection discusses the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) of the
major model variables. The empirical ACFs and CCFs (solid line) are plotted in Fig. 3 on
the next page against the average simulated AFCs and CCFs, and the 95% confidence band
(dashed line). Following Canova (2007), this comparison is used as a goodness-of-fit measure.
Comparing ACFs and CCFs is better than comparing empirical and model-simulated IRFs,
as the ACFs and CCFs are immune to reordering of variables in the VAR system.
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Figure 3: Empirical vs. simulated ACFs
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For better comparison, the autoregressive coefficients are also documented in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Autocorrelations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic 0 1 2 3
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553
Model corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.613 0.324 0.118
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.106) (0.150) (0.157)
Data corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.569 0.262 0.057
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.107) (0.147) (0.149)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.574 0.269 0.063
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.106) (0.147) (0.150)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.618 0.329 0.122
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.103) (0.147) (0.155)
As seen from both Fig. 3 and Table 4 above, the model compares well vis-a-vis data. Em-
pirical ACFs for output and investment are slightly outside the confidence band predicted
by the model, while the ACFs for total factor productivity, household consumption and gov-
ernment consumption are well-approximated by the model. Labor market variables are also
well-described by the model dynamics: ACFs for vacancies, employment and unemployment
are close to predicted ones until the third lag. The ACF for the wage rate is well-captured
only until the first lag. However, this is a common shortcoming of this class of models; a
wage rate determined within a Nash bargaining framework has been demonstrated to fea-
ture such limitations (e.g. Shimer 2010).38 Overall, the search and matching model, and
the trade frictions in particular, generates persistence in output and both employment and
38Alternative modeling of wage determination is proposed by Moen (1997), where wage rates are posted
in advance. Introducing rigid and sticky (dependent on lagged values) wages improves the persistence in the
wage rate in the model, but does not provide a good explanation for the improved fit.
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unemployment, and is able to respond to the criticism in Nelson and Plosser (1992), Cogley
and Nason (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), who argue that the RBC model
does not have a strong internal propagation mechanism besides the strong persistence in
the TFP process.39 Whatismore, the search and matching approach dominates the setup
with invisible hours, developed by Rogerson (1988), and incorporated in the RBC setup by
Hansen (1985). In those models, labor market is modeled in the Walrasian market-clearing
spirit, and output and unemployment persistence is low. In contrast, the model with search
and matching frictions is able to generate high persistence in lags, due to the history depen-
dence arising from the employment status.40
Table 5: Dynamic correlations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Data corr(nt, (y/n)t−k) -0.342 -0.363 -0.187 -0.144 0.475 0.470 0.346
Model corr(nt, (y/n)t−k) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(s.e.) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.031) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Data corr(nt, wt−k) 0.335 0.452 0.447 0.328 -0.04 -0.39 -0.57
Model corr(nt, wt−k) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(s.e.) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.044) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003)
Data corr(vt, ut−k) 0.171 -0.314 -0.308 -0.630 -0.010 0.240 0.220
Model corr(vt, ut−k) 0.181 0.069 -0.166 -0.983 -0.042 0.182 0.257
(s.e.) (0.158) (0.159) (0.166) (0.010) (0.148) (0.138) (0.150)
The relatively very low contemporaneous correlation between wages and employment in Bul-
garia is relatively well-approximated in the model. Besides the fact that the wage rate is
39Furthermore, Den Haan et al. (2000) endogeneize the job separation rate and introduce a costly capital
mobility into an RBC model with search and matching to show that the augmented framework can produce
an amplified propagation mechanism for technology shocks.
40More specifically, the employment status depends on the household’s status last period. The two tran-
sition probabilities are not the same: the probability of losing the job is fixed, while the probability of a
match is endogenous.
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determined through Nash-bargaining procedure, the presence of fiscal policy also helps to
move the correlation in the right direction: Taxes decrease the return to both labor and
capital, while the presence of government spending diverts some of the resources available,
as non-productive (”wasteful”) government consumption rule is modeled as a fixed share of
output. Finally, the dynamic correlation between vacancies and unemployment in Bulgaria
is also well-captured by the model. Increase in vacancies leads to decrease in unemployment,
and that is what we see in data. That is also a dimension that the standard RBC model
calibrated for Bulgaria(Vasilev 2009) cannot capture, since vacancies are not featured there.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the quantitative importance of search and matching frictions in
Bulgarian labor markets. This is done by augmenting an otherwise standard real business
cycle model a la Long and Plosser (1983) with two-sided costly search and fiscal policy.
The model is consistent with data along the labor market dimension, and dominated setups
rooted in the perfectly-competitive labor markets paradigm, e.g Vasilev (2009), as well as the
indivisible labor extension used in Hansen (1985). The search-and-matching setup introduces
history-dependence in employment status, which raises the persistence in both employment
and unemployment, something that Hansen’s (1985) and Rogerson’s (1988) setups cannot
capture, since running an unemployment lottery over time erases all history-dependence.
Still, the failure of the model along some of the labor market dimensions suggest that the
setup is far from perfect. As a suggestion for future research, the model could focus on
other important frictions in the labor market, and the informational asymmetries in partic-
ular. One possible venue for further investigation is to extend the labor market setup with
efficiency wages along the lines of Vasilev (2017a, 2017b).
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